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Abstract 
It has long been known that psychopathology can influence social perception, but a novel two-
dimensional framework of mind perception provides the opportunity for a new understanding of 
some disorders.  We examined the covariation of mind perception with 3 subclinical 
syndromes—autism-spectrum disorder, schizotypy, and psychopathy—and found that each 
presents a unique mind perception profile.  Autism-spectrum disorder involves reduced 
perception of agency in adult humans.  Schizotypy involves increased perception of both agency 
and experience in entities generally thought to lack minds.  Psychopathy involves reduced 
perception of experience in adult humans, children, and animals.  Disorders are differentially 
linked with the over- or under-perception of agency and experience in a way that helps explain 
their real-world consequences. 
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  Mental disorders can reveal themselves in distortions of social perception.  A person with a 
disorder may have difficulty understanding the goals of others, or in more profound cases, may 
ascribe life to inanimate objects or entirely fail to recognize mental states at all.  Such distorted 
mind perception not only has consequences for sufferers of disorders and society at large, but 
may also help in understanding the etiology, diagnosis and treatment of psychopathology.  In this 
research, we examine three subclinical syndromes associated with interpersonal difficulties: 
autism-spectrum disorder, schizotypy, and psychopathy.  We predicted that each would be 
characterized by a unique pattern of distorted mind perception. 
  Traditional approaches to psychopathology often treat individual disorders as separate 
entities, each with its own signs, symptoms and etiology.  While this approach has made 
significant progress in defining and treating psychopathology, this compartmentalization of 
disorders belies the integrated nature of the mind.  More recent research takes a “transdiagnostic” 
approach, characterizing separate disorders as different impairments of underlying cognitive 
systems (1).  For example, depression, anxiety and substance abuse all appear to be linked to 
disturbances of affect (2).  We suggest that a number of disorders may be characterized as 
specific distortions of mind perception – atypical ascriptions of mental capacities to other 
entities. 
  Successful interaction with the world requires knowing which entities have minds and 
which do not.  Mind perception can therefore be distorted by over-perception (perceiving a non-
existent mind), and under-perception (failing to perceive an existent mind).  Research suggests 
that both can be associated with adverse consequences for perceivers and targets--consequences 
that range from social faux pas to violence and death.  For instance, the over-perception of mind Distortions of Mind Perception 4 
in infants can lead to child abuse (3), while the under-perception of mind in adults can lead to the 
denial of moral rights (4; 5).   
  While psychopathology has long been linked to abnormal social perception, recent 
discoveries provide a novel framework for understanding the link between mental disorders and 
mind perception.  Originally thought to proceed along a single dimension, mind perception has 
been revealed in a factor-analytic study to occur along independent dimensions of experience 
(e.g., the capacity for pleasure, fear, hunger) and agency (e.g., the capacity for self-control, 
planning, memory) (6). Adult humans are typically seen as capable of both experience and 
agency, whereas children and animals are seen as capable of mainly experience.  Gods and 
robots are seen as capable of mainly agency, while the dead are seen as capable of neither.   
  These dimensions capture a range of research on both mind perception and morality (7), 
and similar dimensions surface in studies of stereotyping (8) and the perception of humanness 
(4). This two-dimensional structure allows for a nuanced understanding of mind perception as it 
relates to psychopathology, as different disorders may be characterized by the under- or over-
ascription of experience, agency, or both.  Furthermore, psychopathologies may be linked to 
under and over perception of agency or experience only for certain targets, providing a multi-
dimensional space for understanding psychopathology.  We investigate the link between 
perceptions of mind and three disorders that have been linked to abnormal social function.  
  Autism spectrum.  The autism spectrum is a clear candidate for distorted mind perception.  
Previous research finds that those on the autism spectrum have difficulty representing others' 
mental states (9), however, the precise nature of this difficulty is not fully characterized. Autism 
is consistently linked with failures to understand others’ goals and plans (i.e., their agentic 
mental contents; 10; 11), but there is significant debate about ascriptions of experience.  Some Distortions of Mind Perception 5 
studies find deficits in processing others’ emotional states (12), while others find that individuals 
with autism use emotion-related words similar to matched controls (13) and remain sensitive to 
the emotional discomfort of others (14).  Moreover, although individuals with autism often have 
difficulty interacting with other people, they interact relatively easily with non-human animals 
(15) and robots (16).  This would suggest that while the perception of human minds may be 
impaired, scores on the autism spectrum should be unrelated to the mind ascribed to other 
entities.  
  Schizotypy. Research has suggested that schizotypy may be opposite to autism in the 
domain of social cognition, involving the over-attribution of mental states (17). Such 
promiscuous mind perception may underlie schizotypals’ strange beliefs, magical thinking and 
paranoia.  While adult humans are typically ascribed maximum amounts of both agency and 
experience – creating a ceiling effect that precludes over-attributions – non-human targets should 
be ascribed relatively more mind by those higher in schizotypy. 
  Psychopathy. Psychopathy is characterized by callous affect and interpersonal insensitivity; 
psychopaths are perhaps best known for manipulating others and committing crimes (18).  The 
cause of their frequently cruel behavior is debated, but one prominent theory suggests that 
psychopaths lack the ability to empathize with others (19; 20).  As empathy requires an 
understanding of another’s emotional states (21), we hypothesized that those high in 
psychopathic tendencies would fail to perceive experience in those who normally possess this 
capacity (i.e., humans and animals).  Importantly, as experience is linked to the ascription of 
moral rights (5; 6), its denial would help explain why psychopaths harm both people and animals 
(22).  Distortions of Mind Perception 6 
Method 
Participants were 890 online survey respondents ranging in age from 18 to 73 (M = 32).    
Sixty percent were women, and the majority had some college education. Forty-five participants 
were excluded from analysis for failing to complete the survey or for failing catch items (see 
supporting information). Participants were solicited from internet advertising and undergraduate 
classes to complete the Mind Survey, where they judged the perceived experience and agency of 
nine target entities (Figure 1; see supporting information).  They also completed web versions of 
the Autism-spectrum Quotient scale (AQ) (9), the Schizotypy Personality Questionnaire (SPQ-B) 
(23), and the Self-Report Psychopathy Scale (SPR-III) (24).  Because of confidentiality concerns, 
the “Criminal Behavior” subscale of the SPR-III was not included, and because of the strong 
association between the SPQ-B “Interpersonal” and “Disordered” subscales and the AQ, rs(843) 
> .43, ps < .001, we exclusively examined Cognitive-Perceptual schizotypy.      
  A confirmatory factor analysis supported dividing mind perception into Agency and 
Experience, χ
2 = 546.53, p < .00001 (see supporting information).  Links between mind 
perception and psychopathology were investigated by correlating ratings of Agency and 
Experience with the three subclinical psychopathology indices.  To control for multiple 
comparisons and the large sample size, only unadjusted correlations above |r = .1| were deemed 
significant (all dfs = 843, all ps < .001).  See Figure 1. See supporting information for the 
complete correlation matrix. 
  In order to account for the possible influence of other variables, we examined the link 
between mind perception and gender, age and education.  Age and education had little effect on 
mind perception, with the only significant finding being that increased age and education were 
linked to decreased mind ascription to Superman, A|r (correlation with Agency) = -.21; E|r Distortions of Mind Perception 7 
(correlation with experience) = -.25.  With respect to gender, women ascribed more experience 
to adult humans, E|r = .12, animals, E|r = .18, and babies, E|r = .18 than men did, potentially 
stemming from women possessing greater trait empathy (25).  Additionally, women ascribed 
increased agency to God, A|r = .14, which is consistent with the relatively higher religiosity of 
women (26).  Reported correlations are adjusted for gender where appropriate. 
Results and Discussion    
Autism spectrum. We found that higher scores on the Autism-spectrum Quotient scale 
were associated specifically with reduced perceptions of agency in adult humans, A|r = -.14.  
This observation suggests that the deficits of autism lie primarily with understanding others’ 
goals and plans.  The lack of association between autism spectrum scores and attributions of 
experience, E|r = -.03, suggests that individuals with autism can still empathize with other 
people.  Finally, the lack of distortion in the perception of animals, A|r = -.02; E|r = -.05, and 
robots, A|r = -.006; E|r = -.05, is consistent with reports that some people with autism form 
bonds with these entities despite being disconnected from people (15; 16).  Controlling for 
gender leaves the link between autism spectrum scores and ascription of agency to adult humans 
largely unchanged, A|r = -.13, an interesting finding given that autism spectrum scores are 
generally higher for men (9), as indeed they were in this sample, r = .14, p < .001.   
Schizotypy. Results confirmed that those higher in schizotypy were primarily 
characterized by a tendency to indiscriminately perceive mind—that is, to perceive mental 
capacities where other people typically do not.  Whereas ascriptions of mental capacities to 
human adults were normal for those higher in schizotypy, these individuals ascribed greater 
experience, agency, or both to entities generally perceived to lack mental capacities: trees, A|r = 
.19; E|r = .22, dead people, A|r = .17; E|r = .16, robots, A|r = .12, and animals, A|r = .20.  Higher Distortions of Mind Perception 8 
schizotypy scores were also associated with increased attributions of mind to God, A|r = .15, E|r 
= .13.  Controlling for gender made no difference; there was no apparent relation between gender 
and schizotypy, r = .04, ns. 
  Psychopathy. Consistent with our hypothesis, higher psychopathy scores were associated 
with reduced perceptions of experience to those typically ascribed experience.  Adult humans, 
E|r = -.12, babies, E|r = -.15, and animals, E|r = -.14, were all afforded less experience.  This 
may account for why psychopaths harm these groups – without perceptions of experience, the 
ascription of moral rights also diminishes (4; 7).  Additional regression analyses controlling for 
gender found that psychopathy remained significantly related to reduced experience ascription, 
albeit with reduced magnitudes: adult humans, E|β = -.09, babies, E|r = -.09, and animals E|r = -
.08, all ts > 2.2, all ps < .03.  This reduction of effect size likely stems from the link between 
gender and psychopathy, with males scoring relatively higher – measured in this sample at r = 
.36, p < .001.  Other significant psychopathy correlations were decreased ascriptions of agency to 
adult humans A|r = -.22, and increased perceptions of mind in Superman, A|r = .13; E|r = .13.  
The Superman finding is curious – perhaps psychopaths identify with this invincible hero. 
General Discussion 
Autism spectrum disorders, schizotypy, and psychopathy each involve abnormalities in 
social interaction, but analyzing these disorders in terms of ascriptions of agency and experience 
across a range of targets shows that each has a unique pattern of distorted mind perception.  It is 
worth noting that these findings stem from self-report measures, and that the correlations 
reported are relatively modest, despite their strong statistical significance.  Even small 
correlations, however, can translate to large effects when considering the extremes of 
distributions (i.e., those who qualify for clinical diagnoses). Mind perception in clinical Distortions of Mind Perception 9 
populations may be even more distorted if the link between psychopathology and mind 
perception is non-linear.  Quadratic models designed to explore this possibility did not reveal any 
systematic non-linearity, but our study included only a limited number of individuals who 
surpass the clinical cutoff for each disorder.  Future research using clinical samples could test 
directly for such effects.  
The results of this study help to characterize three disorders and highlight the benefits of 
a transdiagnostic approach (1; 2), whereby disorders are viewed as disturbances of underlying 
cognitive systems.  The findings suggest that mind perception is one such cognitive system that 
would benefit from future research as it relates to psychopathology.  Such research could assist 
with etiology and treatment, for instance, investigating whether adjusting mind perception also 
improves other symptoms of these disorders.  Most of all, these results suggest that the 
characterization of psychopathology should focus not only on minds of sufferers, but also on 
how their minds perceive those of others. 
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Figure Caption 
Figure 1.  Targets located by agency and experience factor scores.  Vectors represent significant 
correlations between mind perception and increased severity of disorder (color coded).  
Horizontal vectors represent variation on agency, while vertical vectors represent variation on 
experience.  Diagonal vectors represent variation on both agency and experience.  For example, 
those with higher Autism quotients ascribe less agency to adult humans (r = -.14).  Vectors are 
scaled to represent magnitude of 
correlation.
 
 
 